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"It is my argument, then, that it was not the 
frontier, seen as a social system distinct and 
isolated from a parent society, which produced 
a new, or even intensified an old, pattern of 
social relationships. Indeed, as Owen Lattimore 
has written, 'frontiers are of social, not 
geographic origin. Only after the concept of 
a frontier exists can it be attached by the 
community that has conceived it to a geographical 
configuration. The consciousness of belonging to 
a group, a group that includes certain people and 
excludes others, must precede the conscious claim 
of the right to live or move about within a 
particular territory. ... In large measure, when 
he go urn er] thought he saw what the frontier did 
to society, he was really seeing what society did 
to the frontier.' The pattern of racial 
relationships established in the eighteenth 
century Cape must be seen in the light of the 
formation of the Cape colonist as a whole, the 
form of his inheritance from Europe and the 
exigencies of the situation he had to face." (1) 
This precisely summarizes the views of Legassick on the so- 
called "Frontier Tradition" in South African historiography. In his 
discussion, Legassick pointed out the necessity of paying closer 
attention to "the frontier" itself and then asks: "What is the 
frontier, what are its specific influences, and how does it produce and 
perpetuate them . . . if indeed it does at all?" (2) This paper will 
concern itself with "the pattern of relationships established" in the 
Eastern Cape in the early nineteenth century, as well as "the exigencies 
of the situation" which the various groups that make up the society had 
to face. 
For want of a better phrase, the Cape Eastern districts will 
be referred to as a f7frontier zoneff. This tern, however, could be 
interchanged with "the frontier" in its narrowest sense without 
suggesting that the area was an exclusive "frontierff, rigidly defined 
with an easily definable and recognizable tradition of social 
relationships. It was an area which witnessed the goings and comings 
of people. It saw the conflicts between various peoples, as well as 
the co-operation between them. It also saw the conflicts and 
co-operation within specific groups, not in isolation from but as part 
of the same social set-up. 
The meeting of the far advanced colonists with the expanding 
Xhosa created a frontier zone of contact and conflict, m d  ultimately 
Government intervention. Before the more violent conflicts between the 
colonists and the Xhosa in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth 
centuries, both had had at least between forty and fifty years of 
trading contact during which their habitations were mixed without 
trouble. (3) The transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth 
century witnessed a succession of events with far reaching consequences 
for both black and white. In 1795 the Dutch East India Company handed 
over the Cape and its eastern district rebellion of the colonists to the 
British Government. In 1796, Ngqika and Ndlambe fought a war of 
succession. In 1799, the colonists in the eastern district of Graaff- 
Reinet attempted another rebellion, which was aborted by the presence 
of Government troops and the armed invasion of the colony by Khoi and 
Xhosa. In 1803, the Colony reverted to the Batavian Government, which 
finally gave it up to the British in 1806. 
Looking at the eastern frontier zone itself, the visit of 
Barrow, the mglish traveller, to Ngqika in 1797, two years after the 
war between that chief and his uncle, brought the Colonial Government 
into the internal politics of the Xhosa. Barrow recognized Ngqika as 
the Xhosa paramount, on behalf of the Government, and the Xhosa who 
were already in the Zuurveld were instructed to return to him. During 
the course of his journey to Ngqika, he met a group of Xhosa who were 
told 
If... that if some few of the colonists had been 
so imprudent as to transgress the treaty, they 
had done it contrary to the express orders, 
and without the knowledge, of government: that 
the colony was now in the possession of a great 
and powerful sovereign, the King of England: 
L that one of his first chiefs had deputed us to 
say that the established boundary should be 
observed on the part of the colonists, but he 
expected also that all these chiefs, who had 
spread themselves over the country cf the 
colonists, with their families, and dependants, 
and cattle, would, without any further delw, 
quickly and peaceably return into their own 
coimtry, and, as a proof of the good intentions 
and friendship of the English Government 
towards the [~hosa] nation, we were now on our 
journey to their great chief, or King Gaika, 
carrying for him a present from the Ehglish 
Governor at the Cape. " (4) 
There is a seeming contradiction in Barrow's mission. He was 
the agent of a government which sought to curb white expansion as well 
as keep frontier peace with the Xhosa, but at the same time he was 
trying to persuade the Xhosa to retire from their habitations in an area 
which the chiefs maintained was uninhabited by the colonists. (5) 
Moreover, the chiefs expressed fear of going back to Ngqika, with whom 
they had quarrelled, and Barrow decided to plead their cause with that 
chief. 
Barrow's interview with Ngqika revealed that the chief had no 
effective authority over the other chiefs, though he claimed first rank 
among them. According to Barrow, Ngqika acceded to his proposals 
except that he would not agree to send back colonists found in 
Xhosaland under a strong escort, as suggested by Barrow, though he was 
willing to return them. (6) At this time deserters like Coenrad Buys (7) 
were already residing with Ngqika, and, in fact, the presence of a 
number of armed supporters of colonists was important in bolstering the 
position of that chief against his rival Ndlambe; presumably, he hoped 
in the same way to use the colonial recognition of his paramountcy 
though the true paramount was the Gcaleka chief, Hintsa, further east. 
Despite Barrow's apparent agreement with Ngqika, a section of 
the Xhosa combined with Khoi and invaded the colony in 1799. This 
invasion was far more disastrous to the colonists in the eastern 
district of Graaff-Reinet than any of the earlier conflicts between 
white and black, as it spread as far west as Swellendam, depopulating 
the frontier of colonists. (8) This invasion had hardly subsided when 
the Batavians took over the abinistration of the Colony. 
Before setting out for the Colony, De Mist had his ideas of 
the eastern frontier carefully prepared and included in his memorandum. 
He desired peace and organized trade with the Xhosa. The colonists 
were to be directed to intensive cultivation of the soil rather than 
cattle-keeping. The supply of arms and ammunition to the colonists 
nearer the Xhosa was to be replaced with t'knives, shears, pins, 
hammers, large nails, thread, ribbons, pipes, tobacco, and all sorts of 
small wares and ornamentstt which could do no harm. In Holland he was 
convinced that the Xhosa were embittered, basing his conclusions on 
Barrow? S accounts. (9) Evidence suggests that during the three years 
of Batavian rule not much was done to improve the relationship between 
Xhosa and colonists. De IGst would have declared war on the Xhosa if 
he had had enough forces. (10) His tour of the frontier at the close 
of 1803 was a failure. (11) He later modified his views on the ill- 
treatment of the Khoi when he noted: 
"This Jeremiad, based on the assertions of 
De Grandpr6 and Barrow, I wrote before I 
had ever traversed the Cape. I did not 
then realise that it was possible for any 
individual to indulge in such violent 
abuse through sheer national envy. If a 
half of what is written is ignored, a 
fourth considered doubtful, and the rest 
modified by reforms, it will be seen that 
the [Khoi] are even more favourable situated 
than the peasant farmers of Meierij .l1 (12) 
The Xhosa, with whom peace had continually to be negotiated, 
were not united. The conventional explanation for the disorder in 
Xhosaland during this time is to attribute this disunity to the 
inherent fissiparous tendencies of the Xhosa, their search for more 
grazing land and water. (13) These alone do not supply the answer. In 
1796 a major split occurred between Ngqika and his uncle, Ndlambe, 
over succession; war ensued, and the latter was defeated and made 
prisoner of the former for two years. Dissatisfied with his lot under 
Ngqika, and unwilling to subject himself to him, Ndlambe withdrew into 
the Zuurveld. The disagreement between these chiefs escalated into 
rivalry and a struggle for power over people. At the moment we can 
only guess at the root causes of this, though the presence of whites in 
Xhosaland may have been partly responsible. This internal disagreement, 
added to the attitude of the colonists, complicated frontier politics. 
In the rivalry between Xhosa chiefs, both individual colonists and the 
administration became heavily involved. (14) 
The visit of Governor Janssens to the eastern frontier early 
in 1803 did not yield any results radically different from those of 
Barrow. During this period, Ndlambe was firmly settled in the 
Zuurveld. (15) During the course of Janssens~s tour he had interviews 
with the various Xhosa chiefs and the records show that he was out to 
impress on the Xhosa the wishes of the Government, which, at least in 
principle, were in accord with those of the colonists. He met the 
Zuurveld chiefs at the Sundays River and, because he was sickened by 
the odour emanating from the Xhosa, his officials had to negotiate with 
them. (16) The most importan-1; point discussed was to impress on the 
Xhosa the Fish River boundary and their withdrawal from the Zuurveld.(l7) 
To effect this, Janssens, like Barrow, decided to intervene in the 
internal quarrels between the Zuurveld chiefs and Ngqika. The Zuurveld 
chiefs desired peace with the colonists, but that was not to be at the 
expense of a foot of their ground. (18) 
If the Zuurveld Xhosa desired peace with the colony though 
keeping their hold on their land, Ngqika's discussions with the 
Governor do not suggest that land was an issue in his relationship with 
the Colony. For him, status and paramountcy were more important. The 
discussions centred on the Zuurveld Xhosa with whom Ngqika was at 
variance. He was advised by the Governor to make peace with the 
ftrebelsf' and -to receive them back from the Zuurveld. Ngqika agreed he 
was at war with the Zuurveld Xhosa, who, he claimed, were his subjects, 
and shrewdly gave as one of his reasons his friendship with the Colony 
and his refusal to join them against the colonists. (19) He therefore 
was quite willing to accept the Fish River as a boundary. Neither at 
this interview nor at any other with a colonial official did Ngqika 
raise issues of land ownership. During the first two decades of the 
nineteenth century, he was more intent on the expulsion of the Zuurveld 
Xhosa by force, so that he could gain control over them. (20) 
The intricate politics on the frontier are well illustrated 
by the actions of Colonist, Government and Xhosa. Everybody desired 
peace. Ngqika, Ifthe friend of the Colonyff, had appealed in vain to the 
Cape Government for supplies of arms and amunition (21), and had now 
resorted to persuading the Government to expel the Zuurveld Xhosa by 
force of arms. The Government, which recognized him as the Xhosa 
paramount, promised him that the so-called rebels would not be treated 
with, though in fact they continued to negotiate with them, in many 
cases even before they met Ngqika. The colonists were themselves 
witnesses to these manoewres, and saw to it that the Govement 
pressed their interests forward through exploiting the basic divisions 
among the Xhosa. This continued even after the British regained 
possession of the Cape in 1806. 
So long as the Government eschewed the use of force, there 
was an uneasy stalemate on the frontier zone, and Ndlmbe and his 
followers remained in the Zuurveld until 1811-12 when war broke out 
anew. The war was preceded by the visit in 1809 of Colonel Collins of 
the 83rd Regiment to investigate the causes of unrest on the frontier. 
In the course of his tour he had interviews with distant Hintsa, chief 
of the senior Gcaleka Xhosa chiefdom, Ngqika and Ndlambe. The accounts 
of these interviews clearly reveal that the Xhosa chiefs were far from 
reconciled with one another. Hintsa claimed a definite portion of land 
and would not accept Collinsts suggestion to allow any of the other 
chiefs to move near him. (22) Ngqika claimed the whole country 
extending from the Kyba River to the Colony, and even the country of 
the San. (23) In spite of this claim, he accepted the Fish River 
boundary once more, and in emphasising his relationship with the other 
chief declared that 
"he had been born and appointed to govern the 
country where he now resided, and that he 
would rather lose his life than the possession 
of it". (24) 
The recommendations of Collins were to have far reaching consequences. 
Convinced that the Xhosa were at variance one with another, he noted: 
"The misfortunes that have happened from the 
want of a chief of the rank and talents 
necessary to secure respect and obedience, 
point out the necessity of a military 
commander." (25) 
He then recommended to Lord Caledon, the then Governor, the forcible 
explusion of the Zuurveld Xhosa and the extension of the boundary to 
the Koonap. (26) 
The recommendations of Collins made little impression on Lord 
Caledon. But during the first quarter of 1811 reports of Xhosa 
depredations increased. (27) These reports, though frequently 
exaggerated and even falsified, were implicitly believed by frontier 
landdrosts or magistrates and transmitted to Cape Town. .Accompanying 
these reports were calls for total warfare against the Xhosa by 
colonists and landdrosts. (28) It was left to Sir John Francis Cradock 
to take the crucial decision whether to go to war or not against the 
Xhosa. 
Sir John Francis Cradock took over the governorship of the 
Colony on September 6, 1811. In his first despatch to Lord Liverpool 
he confessed that he could not give any information as a result of the 
short time that had elapsed since his arrival. (29) Xis next despatch 
shows how quickly he accepted frontier opinion. He wrote: 
"the aggression, at present, appears invariably 
to have been on the part of the [Xhosa] kraals, 
and that most of the Dutch settlers do not seem 
to have acted in any manner likely to produce 
these disorders. If (30) 
He quoted the views of his predecessors as necessitating his taking 
effective steps against the Xhosa. What were the views of his 
predecessors? 
We have at least the views of his immediate predecessors. 
Lord Caledon agreed that the policy of conciliating the Xhosa had 
failed, but he observed in addition that, 
"as the evil is only partial, it may still be 
hoped that a partial act of coercion will 
have an adequateeffect. (31) 
This view was held also by Ryneveld, president of the Burgher Senate, 
who thought that it was 
"better to submit to a certain extent of 
injury than [risk] a great deal for a 
prospect by no means certainff. (32) 
Lt-Gen Grey, Acting Governor before Cradockts arrival, was not convinced 
that all the Xhosa were guilty of depredations. During his brief 
period in office, he ordered Major Lyster to assemble a commando of 
farmers to check the depredations of the Xhosa. He instructed Magor 
Lyster, then commanding on the frontier and stationed in Graaff-Reinet, 
to consult with Landdrosts Stockenstrom and Cuyler and to give such 
assistance and dispose of troops as they required, but warned that the 
troops were 
"on no account to act with hostility against 
the [Xhosa], without the most positive and 
unavoidable necessity; they are merely as a 
support, and protection to the inhabitants, 
and that their efforts are to be considered 
in the present instance as directed against 
a set of wandering Vagabonds, and Marauders, 
in whose atrocities the [Xhosa] nation has 
no concern". (33) 
Even after the war in 1812, Lord Caledon maintained, presumably as a 
reply to the Government, that he did not at any time contemplate a war 
against the Xhosa. (34) 
Be that as it may, Sir John Cradock went on with his plan of 
opening up determined hostilities against the Xhosa. He sent 
reinforcements to the frontier under the command of Lt-Col Graham, with 
instructions to clear the Zuurveld of the Xhosa. As part of the 
preparations for war, a deputation led by Landdrost Stockenstrom visited 
Ngqika to assure him that the intended hostilities were to be directed 
against Ndlambe and the Zuurveld Xhosa and to buy off his neutrality by 
persuasion and gifts. (35) Not unexpectedly, Ngqika, who had long 
advocated the expulsion of the Zuurveld Xhosa, concurred and kept aloof 
during the war which began at the close of 1811. 
The war, which ended with the expulsion of the Xhosa by about 
March 1812 (36), represents the first decisive victory of the Colony 
against the Zuurveld Xhosa. It equally represented a signal triumph of 
frontier opinion aind a deliberate step in the direction of land- 
grabbing by colonists, in which the Government took the lead. Through 
it Cradock immortalized his name among the colonists. On his recall 
from the Cape, the Court of Justice, the Burther Senate, and other 
Boards, civil and ecclesiastical, thadced him for the religious, 
educatfonal, legal, and land improvements he had carried out and, above 
all, for the expulsion of the Xhosa and the extension of the boundaries 
of the Colony. (37) The missionaries at Bethelsdorp thought the 
expulsion of the Xhosa was long overdue. ( 3 8 )  
The attitude of the Home Government to the beginning, course, 
and end of the war was one of typical inconsistency. Sir John Cradock 
was too intent on war to wait for approval from London. When a reply to 
his despatch of October 4, 1811, announcing the declaration of war, came, 
it counselled against it. 
"It must be quite unnecessary for me to point 
out the impolicy of a systematic war with the 
[Xhosa] Nation, or the little benefit that 
could possibly be derived from it by the most 
complete success, aind I an convinced that the 
general interests of the Settlement would be 
better promoted by taking measures of 
precaution against Marauders and repelling 
their intrusions when made than by resorting 
to general offensive hostilities.'' (39) 
Lord Liverpool went further to suggest that Cradock investigate whether 
Xhosa aggression were not measures of retaliation and therefore 
justified by the conduct of the colonists, and referred to Lord 
Macartneyls earlier proclamation. (40) This warning came too late. 
And, from the beginning of the war to its termination, every despatch 
of Cradockcs was aimed at convincing the Home Govement of the 
validity of his policy. (41) 
But in July 1812 Lord Liverpool emphasised his earlier view 
on systematic warfare against the Xhosa. This time, however, Cradock 
got the benefit of the doubt. Lord Liverpool noted: . 
"The operations against the[Xhosa] were 
undertaken at an early period after your 
arrival in the Colony, but I feel assured 
that you had not only received the most 
satisfactory proof that the [Xhosa] have 
no claim or rights to the Territory which 
they have occupied, but also unless there 
was ground for supposing that the occupation 
of those Lands by them whether by right or 
indulgence was injurious to the C~lony.~~ (42) 
In the end, it was the Home Government which surrendered to Cradock, 
and, indirectly, to frontier opinion. 
"His Royal Highness has learnt with peculiar 
satisfaction the termination of the warfare 
with the [Xhosa] Tribes and has commanded me 
to signify his entire approbation of the 
conduct of Colonel Graham and of all the 
Officers and Men employed upon that laborious 
and disagreeable service. The Regulations you 
have made for preventing any infringement of 
[Xhosa] Territory - for collecting into 
villages the inhabitants resident in their 
vicinity added to the vigour with which their 
late aggressions have been repelled and the 
continued presence of so considerable a force 
upon their frontier appear well calculated to 
secure the Colony against future invasion.!? (43) 
The expulsion of the Zuurveld Xhosa brought them into close 
proximity with Ngqika. The years between 1812 and 1818 saw the rise of 
a new kind of leadership and a drive for unity amongst the Xhosa who 
had been expelled from the Zuurveld, and joined .the true paramount, 
Hintsa, who resented Ngqikafs pretensions. The central character in 
this new move was Makana, a prophet-figure who succeeded in combining 
Xhosa customs with Christian ideas and with his preachings won a 
greater number of Xhosa followers than any of the three principal 
chiefs (~gqika, Ndlambe, ~intsa) could muster at the time. (44) At 
this stage, it is only reasonable to suppose that Ndlambe teamed up 
with Makana in order to use him against Ngqika. 
In April 1817, Lord Charles Somerset, who had taken over the 
Administration of the Colony from Cradock in 1814, held a conference 
with some Xhosa chiefs at the Kat River. At this conference, Somerset 
carried forward the tradition of recognizing Ngqika as the Xhosa 
paramount. Ngqika once more professed his friendship with the Colony. 
On being told that the Governor of the Colony considered him to be the 
first chief and had never treated with any others, and that if any 
other chiefs wished to trade with the Colony they could only do so by 
obtaining a pass from him, 
"Gaika said the conversation was very important, 
that he regretted there were not more present 
to hear it, but that the Governor's 
acknowledging him thus publicly was enough. 
He was now ready to enter into any arrangements 
with him". (45) 
The minutes of the conference, as recorded, reveal that Ngqika, in his 
characteristic way, both accepted and rejected paramountcy at one and 
the same time. (46) 
One of the products of the Kat River Conference was the 
introduction of the Spoor Law, i;e. that the Xhosa would collectively 
be responsible for all stolen colonial cattle. This Spoor Law has been 
criticized vehemently by Professor Macmillan (47), but it was not 
entirely the brain-child of Governor Somerset. Indeed, it was an 
extension of the commando system whereby colonists had followed traces 
of stolen cattle. Shortly before Somerset's arrival at the Cape, 
Cradock had introduced what virtually amounted to a Spoor Law. (48) 
Somerset simply obtained the consent of Ngqika to the arrangement which 
had long been demanded by the colonists. 
The expulsion of the Zuurveld Xhosa, their proximity to Ngqika, 
the rise and influence of Makana and the public recognition of Ngqika 
by the Government and the Kat River Conference, meant that, sooner or 
later, the problem of Xhosa paramountcy would have to be faced on the 
battlefield. In 1818, a powerful combination of the followers of 
Ndlambe and Hintsa took the field against those of Ngqika, whom they 
defeated and put to flight with serious casualties. Ngquka himself 
escaped to a hide-out near the Great Winterberg Mountain, from where he 
appealed to the Colonial Government for help. Then came the swift 
intervention of colonial troops from Grahamstown. The erstwhile victors 
took to their heels and Ngqika was reinstated. (49) Incensed by what 
seemed the wanton intervention of the Colonial Government in a purely 
Xhosa affair, the chiefs mustered another combination and marched on 
Grahamstown, the military headquarters on the frontier. This invasion 
was repulsed with tremendous loss, and the Xhosa once more took flight, 
leaving Ngqika as the ultimate victor. (40) The peace treaty concluding 
these successive wars established a belt of the so-called neutral 
territory, free of both Xhosa and colonists, though for the first time 
Ngqika lost part of his land. It was not till the mid-1820s, as the 
"neutral belt" changed into the "Ceded Territoryf1, that the reality of 
this treaty unveiled itself to Ngqika. The records of this period are 
full of loud complaints by the Xhosa against the colony for their loss 
of land. (51) 
The complex politics of the frontier zone, with both black and 
white manipulating each other for their own purposes, suggest that a.ny 
simple view of a "frontier tradition" is misleading. In fact, the 
fluidity of movement renders the very concept of it suspect. 
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